

AD-A130 490


A SUMMARY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE US CATHOLIC  
BISHOP'S DRAFT LETTER... (U) AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL  
J H ROSCOE FEB 83 AU-AWC-83-204

162

UNCLASSIFIED


F/G 5/6

NL



END  
DATE  
8X83  
JHC

CONT



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963-A

2



# AIR WAR COLLEGE

## RESEARCH REPORT

No. AU-AWC-83-204

A SUMMARY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE U.S.

CATHOLIC BISHOP'S DRAFT LETTER--

THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE:


GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN H. ROSCOE

DTIC FILE COPY

AD A130490

DTIC  
ELECT  
S JUL 20 1983 D  
E



AIR UNIVERSITY (ATC)  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC  
RELEASE, DISTRIBUTION  
UNLIMITED

83 07 19 101

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

A SUMMARY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE U.S.

CATHOLIC BISHOP'S DRAFT LETTER --

THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE:

GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE

by

John H. Roscoe, 536-38-7106FR

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUIREMENT

RESEARCH ADVISOR: CHAPLAIN LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE H.

UPDEGROVE

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

February 1983



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR WAR COLLEGE (ATC)  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112

Office of the Dean  
School of Resident Programs

The attached research report was completed by the author while attending the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The student was given every opportunity to express ideas, criticize concepts, and develop new solutions in a free and open academic environment. This report was not formally edited by the staff nor faculty and does not necessarily represent official Air War College, Air Force, or Department of Defense policy. It is not approved for release to the public. Reproduction in part or whole can only be approved by the Air War College. Distribution of the paper is made with one goal in mind: to enhance the military profession.

*Robie Hackworth*  
ROBIE HACKWORTH, Colonel, USAF  
Dean, School of Resident Programs



Accession For		
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Justification		
<i>7/20/84</i>		
Dist		
Available to		
Dist		
A		

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER . . . . .	iii
	SUMMARY . . . . .	iv
	BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH . . . . .	v
I	INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II	AN OVERVIEW OF THE PASTORAL LETTER . . . .	4
	Section I Peace in the Modern World: Religious Perspectives and Principles . . . . .	4
	Section II War and Peace in the Modern World: Problems and Principles. . . . .	5
	Section III The Promotion of Peace: Proposals and Policies . . . . .	7
	Section IV The Pastoral Challenge and Response . . . . .	10
III	SECTION I PEACE IN THE MODERN WORLD: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES . .	12
IV	SECTION II WAR AND PEACE IN THE MODERN WORLD: PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES . . . . .	16
V	SECTION III THE PROMOTION OF PEACE: PROPOSALS AND POLICIES . . . . .	28
VI	SECTION IV THE PASTORAL CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE . . . . .	31
VII	IMPACT ON MILITARY PREPAREDNESS . . . . .	34
	NOTES . . . . .	39
	BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	46

#### DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER

This research report represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force.

This document is the property of the United States Government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY

TITLE: A SUMMARY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE U.S.  
CATHOLIC BISHOP'S DRAFT LETTER--THE CHALLENGE OF  
PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE

AUTHOR: John H. Roscoe, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Opens with a 1500 word summary of the Bishop's 24,000 word draft pastoral letter. A critical analysis of each of the document's four sections follows. The final chapter offers a view of the impact of this letter on military preparedness. There are only two moral injunctions addressed to Catholic military personnel: it is immoral to target cities and the "arms race" is condemned as dangerous and wasteful of resources. The admonition against a "first strike" with nuclear weapons is ambigious enough to permit individual interpretation. Intentional targeting of cities has been outlawed by international conventions and agreements for years. The "arms race" condemnation is so non-specific that its effect on U.S. military personnel is nil.



### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel John H. Roscoe (M.S. Air Force Institute of Technology) is a career logistician. He also completed four years of off-duty training and was ordained to ministry as a Catholic deacon in 1977. He has served in both Air Force chapels and off-base churches. Colonel Roscoe is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1983.

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to provide a summary of the draft document on war and peace written by an ad hoc committee for the Catholic bishops of the United States. I will follow the summary with a critique of the document's major points. This summary and critique should be helpful to the many Air Force people who cannot devote the time required to study this 24,000 word document, yet recognize its importance. It is a barometer of what can be expected from Catholic religious leaders in the future unless significant changes in thought and attitude occur in the next few years.

The second purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the draft document on the 22 percent of the Air Force who are Catholic. Will the moral imperatives and condemnations in the document cause significant numbers of Air Force people to renounce maintaining, provisioning, training with and operating tactical and strategic nuclear systems? There are many people at various levels of command throughout the Air Force concerned about this possibility. Can the bishops forbid their church members from participating in tasks closely associated with nuclear war-fighting? If they can, will they? Is there a historical precedent of similar circumstances? What would be the most probable

result today based on these similiar circumstances? These are the challenges of the second part of this paper.

First, a few paragraphs to introduce the concept and origins of a "pastoral letter." A pastoral letter is, according to Webster's dictionary, a letter from a pastor or bishop to the congregation, usually containing guidance. The draft pastoral to be examined fits that description. Its introduction concludes with this sentence: "We write this pastoral letter to make available the moral and religious resources of the Catholic tradition as an aid in making the many choices which must be made on war and peace today."<sup>1</sup> The draft was written by five bishops appointed as an ad hoc committee on war and peace in 1981. They were appointed by the president of the United States Catholic Conference (USCC), a national organization with all Catholic bishops as members but with priests, religious and lay people included in its major departments. The USCC provides funding and direction to many national projects including a vast U.S. anti-poverty program, the Catholic Relief Service for overseas aid, and education programs for Catholics.

The five bishops on the committee have a diversity of views on war. The committee also included a permanent staff of five consultants with decidedly pacifist views who are experts in the field of peace and justice. The committee presented their first draft to about 275 bishops in June, 1982.

The draft was also distributed to theologians, bishops in other countries, people who had given formal testimony during hearings conducted by the bishops and several government agencies. The committee received over 700 critiques. The draft was re-written and presented again in October, 1982. This paper addresses that second draft. The draft will again be revised and presented to the bishops in May, 1983. The chairman of the ad hoc committee has said the document simply needed refinements before being presented again in May.<sup>2</sup> Major modification of the document is therefore unlikely.

Chapter II will present an overview of the document with a summary of the four major sections. The purpose of Chapter II is to provide a summary of the entire document in about 1500 words. The summary does not contain my subjective judgement or commentary. It includes the approximate word length of each part of the document as one indicator of its importance to the pastoral letter. Chapters III, IV, V, and VI will analyze and critique the four sections of the document. Chapter VII will address the impact of this document upon our nuclear warfare capability.

## CHAPTER 1.

### AN OVERVIEW OF THE PASTORAL LETTER

One quick way of presenting a broad picture of the document is to simply present the major section outline. I will selectively show sub-divisions where they are self-explanatory enough to benefit the reader. I'll provide a summary paragraph after each of the major sections.

#### Section I. Peace in the Modern World: Religious Perspectives and Principles

- A. Peace and the Kingdom
- B. Kingdom and History
- C. The Moral Choices for the Kingdom

Summary: The section begins by establishing the threat to the planet imposed by nuclear warfare. Part A (2000 words) explains a development of the concept of peace. It is a series of Biblical Old Testament and New Testament quotations. The quotations are separated by interpretive remarks focusing on the idea of peace as a gift of God to all people. Part B (900 words) is a corrective of Part A. Here the biblical vision of permanent world peace is recognized as a utopia to be worked at but probably not achieved. Part C (1500 words) describes the pacifist tradition and the seven criteria which validate the just war theory.

## Section II. War and Peace in the Modern World: Problems and Principles

- A. The New Moment
- B. Religious Leadership in the Public Debate
- C. The Use of Nuclear Weapons
  - 1. Counterpopulation warfare
  - 2. Initiation of nuclear war
  - 3. Limited nuclear war
- D. Deterrence in Principle and Practice
  - 1. The concept of deterrence
  - 2. The moral issues

Summary: The section begins with an appeal to fear of the terrible lethality of nuclear weapons. This appeal is used to support the view that nuclear warfare is a totally new moral issue. Part A (1300 words) continues the view that nuclear war is not survivable. It condemns the arms race, equating it to the devastation of nuclear war. Part A ends with the declaration that nuclear war must be rejected. How to move public policy toward achieving international peace is recognized as a much more complex task. Part B (400 words) simply advocates a legitimate role for religious leaders in the public process of maintaining peace. This role is in terms of setting limits on "military policy." Part C (1800 words) first establishes that pacifists oppose all nuclear war. Just war theory cannot legitimize general nuclear war because the criteria of proportionality and

discrimination cannot be met. Even limited nuclear war would be terribly devastating, therefore prevention of war is required. Three aspects of nuclear war are then considered. Attacks on non-combatants are condemned. No first use of nuclear weapons is permitted because battlefield commanders cannot control them and escalation from limited to general nuclear war is a possibility. Retaliatory use of nuclear weapons in a limited war is questioned but no judgment is made. Part D (3200 words) explores the morality of deterrence in terms of the method used to achieve deterrence. The letter assumes U.S. targeting of non-combatants. It builds to a judgment that all nuclear deterrence is immoral. Quoted here is part of the USCC statement in 1976, To Live in Christ Jesus<sup>1</sup> which reiterates it is wrong to attack civilian populations and also wrong to threaten to hit them. This is followed by some of Cardinal John Kroll's Congressional testimony (speaking for the USCC) in 1979, in which he restated the 1976 admonition but left out the term "civilian populations." That leaves all nuclear deterrence wrong. Cardinal Kroll would tolerate the evil of deterrence only so long as progress is being made toward disarmament. The pastoral then attempts to blend Cardinal Kroll's testimony with Pope John Paul II's statement that deterrence should not be permanent but only a step toward disarmament. The letter then describes some "negative dimensions" of deterrence such

as the evil of intending to use nuclear weapons and the diversion of money to the arms race away from the poor. This part concludes with a series of criteria, recommendations, and condemnations proposed for public use to insure that everything from new strategic weapon systems to strategic nuclear strategy contributes materially to progressive disarmament.

### Section III. The Promotion of Peace: Proposals and Policies

#### A. Specific Steps to Reduce the Danger of War and Disarmament

1. Accelerated work for arms control, reduction, and disarmament
  - a. Need for international agreements
  - b. Reduction of political tensions
  - c. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968
2. Continued insistence on efforts to minimize the risk of non-nuclear war
  - a. Reduce conventional forces
  - b. Reduce arms sales
  - c. Limit force to self-defense or allies



3. Develop non-violent means of resolving conflict
    - a. Diplomacy, negotiation, compromise
    - b. Emphasize right of non-violence
    - c. Study practicality of Civil Defense programs
    - d. Formally budget for peace research
    - e. Establish national study center for peace
  4. The role of conscription
    - a. Conscription
    - b. Selective conscientious objection
  5. The relationship of nuclear and conventional defense
- B. Shaping a Peaceful World
1. World order in catholic teaching
  2. The superpowers in a disordered world
  3. Interdependence: From fact to policy

Summary: This section builds upon an understanding of peace as not merely the absence of war. Peace involves developing respect, confidence and trust among ourselves and internationally. Part A (2400 words) presents a series of steps which presumably lead to an increase in world peace. Independent U.S. unilateral arms control initiatives are urged as a start toward verifiable bilateral reductions. Maximum pursuit of a dialogue with the Soviets is encouraged

along with increased enforcement of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. Reductions in both chemical/biological weapons and the sale of armaments to other nations must happen to reduce the risk of conventional war. All countries must shift attitudes away from the projection of military force to settle disputes with other nations. Part A then expands this notion of diplomacy as a substitute for armed conflict. Non-violence is suggested as a legitimate goal for nations as well as individuals. The rights of an individual to selectively conscientiously object to a particular war are extolled. Part A concludes with a recognition that the void left by nuclear weapons reductions may require added conventional forces. A strengthening of conventional military forces would be acceptable to replace nuclear forces if that exchange reduces the possibility of nuclear conflict. Part B (3000 words) returns to the theme of peace building. Proceeding from the religious ideal of a world human family, that is, that all people are brothers and sisters, both human and nation-state interdependence is recognized. The lack of an effective international enforcer of peace and justice is understood. The difficulties, as a result, in U.S./USSR relations and relations by both superpowers with the Third World countries are articulated. U.S. leadership is urged to renew and strengthen United Nations capabilities and to vigorously attack economic, social, and political injustice in the Third World.

#### Section IV. The Pastoral Challenge and Response

##### A. The Church: A Community of Conscience, Prayer and Penance

1. Formation of conscience
2. Reverence for life in the pursuit of peace
3. Prayer
4. Penance

##### B. Challenge and Hope

Part B is organized as a series of addresses to ten separate categories of American Catholics without paragraph numbering:

To Priests and Religious, To Educators, To Parents, To Youth, To Men and Women in the Military, To Men and Women in Defense Industries, To Men and Women of Science, To Men and Women of the Media, To Public Officials, To Catholics as Citizens.

Summary: The focus of this section is the responsibility of Christians faced with the moral question of nuclear war.

Part A (2200 words) recognizes agreement is likely on only the most basic moral principles. Honest divergent opinions on methods of building peace are acknowledged. Objective teaching, using this letter as a framework, is encouraged in all Catholic churches across the nation. American Catholics are charged with building a consensus among Americans

willing to recognize and work at eradicating the many forms of violence evident in society today. These include oppression of the poor, the helpless aged, sexual exploitation and inhumane prison conditions. It is thought that acceptance of this type of violence leads to acceptance of the killing of non-combatants in war. Personal and community prayer are seen as powerful means of helping to achieve the changing of attitudes among Americans. Part B (2300 words) continues the challenge of Catholics to work to sensitize the American conscience. Nine separate categories of Catholic Americans are addressed. The tenth and final category is the Catholic citizen. The underlying theme throughout each is the challenge to become sensitive to war and peace issues in the home, workplace and school. Military and defense industry people are given specific injunctions concerning the design, manufacture and use of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Each of the following four chapters will present a critique of a section of the bishop's pastoral letter.

### CHAPTER III

#### Section I--"Peace In the Modern World: Religious Perspectives and Principles"

This section begins with some "signs of the times" which have particularly influenced the bishops writing this letter. One is a quote from Vatican II about the arms race: "The arms race is one of the greatest curses on the human race and the harm it inflicts upon the poor is more than can be endured."<sup>1</sup> The terms "arms race" and its resultant "curse on the human race" and "harm to the poor" may be the least understood phrase in war and peace public discussion today. It persuades that the superpowers are locked into an uncontrolled competition to see who can develop the most expensive, outlandish, destructive weapons systems without regard to cost. Moreover, if this maddening race could be stopped, billions of dollars (and rubles) would be available to feed, clothe and educate the world's poor. First point: the arms race is not a curse. The Department of Defense is modernizing by replacing tanks, ships, missiles and airplanes that have been in service for 20 years with some as many as 30 years old (B-52 bomber aircraft). Is it an "arms race" to update machines that have been in service for three decades? I know of no area in our society where machine obsolescence is in such pitiful similiar circumstance. It is apparently acceptable for our military men and women to stake their lives on aging equipment with limited capability. Can we

stop the race with the Soviets? Of course we can. We can stop our research and development and production of replacement equipment. In five to eight years we will no longer be capable of projecting military power to deter aggression. But will the poor be fed, clothed and educated? No, and the reason has nothing to do with military equipment modernization. We have enough food today in government warehouses to feed millions of people. Why are we not doing it? It is not because we are replacing a 30 year old bomber fleet. It is because of the apathy and unconcerned attitude of the majority of Americans, including Catholics. The same selfish attitude this pastoral letter is so hopeful of changing. Throughout this letter is recognized the need to change the heart of Americans. I believe that is the only way to do more for the poor. I think the entire DOD budget could be delivered to Congress tomorrow for redistribution and, after significant tax refunds were made to the electorate, precious little, if any, would go to feed, clothe or educate the poor. Later in this letter, in another condemnation of the "arms race," the writer says, "if the arms race is not reversed, resources will not be available for the human needs . . . in our own country as well."<sup>2</sup> The hundreds of thousands of Americans employed today because airplanes, ships, and tanks are being built are certainly part of the "human needs" in this country.

The other "sign of the times" is the unique dangers and dynamics of the nuclear arms race which present qualitatively new problems for our traditional moral principles. Unfortunately, the document never explicitly states how the nuclear arms race presents these qualitatively different moral challenges. The specter of nuclear war is absolutely horrifying. It does not, however, present any qualitative new challenge to traditional moral principles! The just war theory deals adequately with the moral challenges imposed by the nuclear age. Indeed, the criteria imposed by just war theory are highly restrictive, as we shall see later in this critique.

Part A is a collection of selected biblical quotations concerning the search for a peaceful world. The scriptural notion of justice as an integral part of peace is barely mentioned. Justice for oppressed peoples must be addressed as a necessary step in building a lasting peace. Part B sets forth a more realistic view of the difficulties to be surmounted in a quest for peace with the Soviets. Part C presents two facets of Christian action on issues of war. Having just read selected scriptural references related to non-violence, the reader now finds two positions explained. The first is the non-violent pacifist position which is inaccurately presented as if it has equal acceptance in Catholic tradition with the just war theory. Sincere advocates of non-violence have always been a tiny

minority in Catholic history. Bishop Alfred Hughes, on the final day of the Bishop's meeting in Washington, D.C., November 18, 1982, commenting in open forum on this section on the pastoral letter: "the non-violent stance really deals with the gospel ideal to which individuals have aspired with the endorsement of the Church . . . but which has never been considered mandatory for all, especially for governments entrusted with the responsibility to protect their citizenry."<sup>3</sup>

The just war tradition is then presented in the letter. The seven criteria are accurately portrayed. Two of the seven are especially applicable to highly lethal weapons use. These are "proportionality" and "discrimination." These criteria will be discussed later in this paper. Proportionality is simply the moral restraint which insists that a nation must not commit to war, with its tremendous toll in human and material resource, without a proportionally greater good to be preserved. Discrimination is a principle that prohibits direct military action against non-combatant civilian populations.



## CHAPTER IV

### Section II--"War and Peace in the Modern World: Problems and Principles"

This section begins with the statement that nuclear warfare poses a unique "never previously conceived moral position."<sup>1</sup> The reader is apparently supposed to simply accept this statement. It is not substantiated anywhere in the document. There are many words about nuclear war destroying the world but no facts to document the assertions. It is certainly less than objective to attempt to frighten people into accepting a certain point of view using a series of myths concerning nuclear war. It is theoretically possible to destroy most of the people on earth if the Soviets and the U.S. divided up the world's land area and each targeted nuclear weapons over as much population as could be struck. Does that make nuclear war a totally unique moral issue? Nearly the same amount of destruction could be accomplished with conventional or biological or chemical weapons if the hundreds of thousands of existing weapons were exploded without warning around the globe. So why is nuclear war unique? Is it because nuclear weapons issue radioactive fallout? Dr. Edward Teller, a nuclear physicist, has the technical credentials to speak about fallout.

Fallout is part of many myths (concerning nuclear arms) and one of the common misunderstandings has to do with the durability and extent of its effects. The radioactivity of fallout declines rapidly. For example,

if 1000 rems per hour (a lethal dose) were released by a bomb, seven hours later the dose would be 100 rems per hour (far below lethal). In 49 hours, radiation would be 10 rems per hour."<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Teller continues by describing how intense radiation occurs in close proximity to the explosion and nearby down wind. The only risk with food is from eating food contaminated with radioactive ash. Covered food is not affected. It can easily be filtered from water. He tells the tragic story of the 23 Japanese fishermen covered with fallout three hours after a multi-megaton nuclear blast in 1954. They made no attempt to brush or wash off the ash. All suffered skin lesions, some had nausea, vomiting, etc. One died a few days later and two died 20 years later of liver disorders possibly connected to the radiation. The rest have survived. Nuclear war is horrifying enough without succumbing to unfounded doomsday myths and then claiming the advent of a unique moral dilemma never before considered as a consequence. As Dr. Teller says, "Preventing war--in particular, nuclear war--is our single most important task. Should nuclear war occur . . . the number of people killed would be truly terrifying, but many more would survive."<sup>3</sup>

The document returns again to condemning the "arms race" as a danger, unjust to the poor and unable to provide security. Briefly, equipment modernization poses less danger, not more. Vastly improved accuracy allows much smaller warheads able to precisely destroy military targets. The heavy, huge megatonnage weapons have disappeared from U.S.

nuclear arsenals. They are being replaced by smaller, lighter weapons. As to the security provided by nuclear weapons, the NATO alliance countries could be an example. The Soviet model of aggression has been clear: introduce or add to existing social and political unrest in a country, followed by a government takeover with indigenous or surrogate communists. Any threats to the new communist leadership quickly results in requests for Soviet help in "maintaining order," as in Afghanistan. The Soviets have never, nor are they likely to, invade with a fighting force unless they are absolutely convinced they can win a conflict. Enter here the nations of Western Europe. I agree with George F. Kennan that it is a myth to believe that Soviets leaders have been obsessed since World War II with a desire to overrun Western Europe and have only been held off by our nuclear retaliatory force.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, Kennan agrees that incentives for the Soviets to use the subversion, takeover, and occupy model in Western Europe are high but, "the NATO involvement meant that any attempt to realize such an extension would involve very high risks of major war."<sup>5</sup>

The bishops "see with clarity the political folly of a system which threatens mutual suicide."<sup>6</sup> I do not claim to see with clarity; however, if by threatening to inflict destruction upon Soviet military bases, missile sites and military command and control centers, the Soviets are

deterred from aggression against our allies, then the system is not one of folly or "mutual suicide" but moral good.

Section IIB provides the rationale for religious leadership in debating public policy. There appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding in one task the bishops have set for themselves. They state, "We believe religious leaders have a task in concert with public officials, analysts, private organizations and the media to set the limits beyond which our military policy should not move in word or action."<sup>7</sup> The U.S. national security objective is, "to preserve the U.S. as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact."<sup>8</sup> The policy to achieve that objective is determined by the President and the National Security Council (NSC). International relations involve at least two policies to be developed and integrated into one national security policy--military and State Department policy. The bishops intend to skip over the National Security Council and evaluate military policy in detail. Later in the pastoral they evaluate the wisdom of buying an MX missile and other parts of policy based on moral principles. That appears presumptuous and imprudent with one consequence being the loss of their credibility and teaching authority. It is certainly praiseworthy and a noble task to try and develop broad moral guidelines for the National Security Council to consider in their formulation of specific policy. It is a misunderstanding of that policy process to

attempt to evaluate specific weapon systems or the detailed military strategy concerning use of tactical nuclear weapons in an unbounded future conflict without historical precedent. This nation needs moral guidance pertaining to its overall nuclear policy, not judgment on specific military strategies or evaluations of American and enemy tactics.

Section IIC addresses the use of nuclear weapons. I absolutely agree with the prohibition against targeting non-combatants. I totally disagree with the logic supporting U.S. no first use of nuclear weapons against military targets after our forces have been attacked. Secretary of Defense Weinberger addressed this question recently. He said,

Our weapons are intended for defense only. We will not employ them unless necessary to preserve our peace and security. But to declare a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons is an open invitation to the Soviets to use their conventional strength to threaten us and our allies.<sup>9</sup>

The bishops argue that our commanders could not exercise control over their weapons. Incredibly, they believe loss of control would result in increased launches of weapons and the re-targeting of them away from the attacking enemy forces onto cities. The logic of that chain of events escapes me. I do not accept it as possible, let alone probable. Robert L. Spaeth, Dean of the College of Arts and Science, Saint John's University was addressing the issue of moral leadership by the bishops in a speech on December 6, 1982.

He says, in criticism of the bishop's prohibition of first-use of nuclear weapons, that their reason is the unacceptable risk of escalation: "any estimate of the risks of future military actions is bound to be unreliable . . . in short they are making judgments diplomats and political leaders are called upon to make . . . along with responsible citizens. The bishops are in an area where nothing is certain, everything is debatable. To pretend to be able to assert firm moral guidance at this level of complexity is to mislead one's followers."<sup>10</sup> The bottom line is that first use of nuclear weapons as a defensive measure after Soviet attack is a deterrent. It is morally evil to remove the deterrent and thereby increase the possibility of armed conflict. Pope John Paul II's plea in his Angelus message of December 13, 1981 is absolutely correct. There are no good choices in war, especially nuclear war. Bilateral reduction and future elimination of nuclear armaments is the only morally and humanly valid choice.

Section IID opens with the observation that its subject, deterrence, is in the forefront of the political and moral debate about nuclear weapons. The purpose of deterrence is acknowledged as the prevention of "one of the worst political and moral evils which could be perpetrated . . . nuclear war."<sup>11</sup> The moral problem with deterrence is the method used, say the bishops. Nowhere in the document is any substitute method offered, however.

This section begins a lengthy discussion of the moral issues with a quote from the FY 1983 Military Posture Statement which states deterrence depends upon the assured capability ". . . to inflict damage on the Soviet Union disproportionate to any goal . . . Soviet leaders might hope to achieve."<sup>12</sup> The bishops argue this means a willingness to hit "targets of value," and then categorically state this means intentionally targeting civilian populations or industrial targets which would kill large numbers of civilians. It is this blurring of moral principles by, in this instance, the inserting of the word "or" which mixes the morality of targeting of civilian populations with that of industrial targets that results in loss of clarity. One more time: it is unquestionably immoral to target cities to intentionally kill civilians. It is expressly forbidden by the Hague Convention IV and IX, agreed to by the US in 1907. In January 1969, the United Nations adopted Resolution 2444 which prohibits attacking civilian populations. The Allies and Axis Powers in World War II did not adhere to the traditional protection afforded civilian populations. The Germans mistakenly bombed a British city early in the war. The British retaliated by bombing a German city. These reprisal raids continued for several months. The lack of technical means to accurately bomb was also a factor. Then there were claims that cities were involved in war production (Nagasaki, Hiroshima). Let us hope the bishop's moral

prohibition against attacking cities is followed in any future armed conflict, large or small.

It is not, however, immoral or illegal to strike certain industrial targets if "they make an effective contribution to an adversary's military action so that their capture, destruction or neutralization offers a definite military advantage."<sup>13</sup> This is upheld morally by the proportionality criteria imposed upon just war and quoted earlier in the pastoral letter (p. 312). In summary it says the consequences of each act of war must be judged in relation to the good result (destruction of enemy war-fighting materials) and the unintended destruction of civilians who may be near the area. It is upheld in international law by the same Hague conventions and U.N. resolutions just cited supporting no international bombing of civilian populations. In summary, it is morally wrong and indefensible to attack or threaten to attack a civilian population. Industrial targets may be attacked depending upon their contribution to the war effort.

The key part of Section II and probably the entire document begins on page 316. Cardinal John Kroll, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1979, concerning SALT II, introduced two new conditions into the deterrence debate. These conditions have been inserted word for word into this pastoral! Neither condition represented any consensus among Catholics or their bishops as Cardinal Kroll clearly stated at the



beginning of his testimony.<sup>14</sup> Yet the testimony has now become a key part of this allegedly representative document. The two conditions are as follows: first, both the use and intent to use strategic nuclear weapons is wrong. Incredibly, Cardinal Kroll states this immediately after quoting from a statement on deterrence made in 1976 by the USCC which says the same thing but includes the traditional "to attack civilian populations" phrase.<sup>15</sup> Cardinal Kroll dropped that key distinction! The second condition follows. Since just possessing and threatening to use nuclear weapons, even on military targets is evil, possession will only be tolerated as long as there is hope for success in negotiating reductions in weapons. If that hope disappears, "the moral attitude of the Catholic Church would almost certainly have to shift to one of uncompromising condemnation of both use and possession of such weapons."<sup>16</sup>

Cardinal Kroll has articulated a posture, accepted into this pastoral, which is a radical departure from 2000 years of Catholic tradition and all papal and bishop's conciliar statements regarding the morality of war. A summary of that tradition: "While the church has consistently allowed one to forego self-defense, it has never been willing to impose an obligation to do so. An obligation of this kind would give an advantage to the unjust aggressor and weaken the cause of justice."<sup>17</sup> An arsenal of nuclear weapons maintained as a deterrent achieves a moral

good by preventing the use of nuclear weapons. If it is used for military or political purposes other than deterrence, then possessing the arsenal may be immoral. As long as its sole purpose is deterrence, a moral good, it can and should be retained. Cardinal Kroll's conditional possession is based on "meaningful arms reduction." It takes two to negotiate reductions. If the Soviets were to refuse to negotiate, following the Cardinal's (and the pastoral's) logic, we should unilaterally disarm. That, of course, would create an imbalance which would heighten dramatically the potential use of the weapons by the Soviets. It is also important to recognize that unilateral disarmament by the U.S. does not rid the world of nuclear weapons. As an editor of America magazine has noted,

Nuclear weapons would be saved to keep the current ruling party in power, and factions within the [Communist] party would be tempted to use them against each other. In fact, the chances of nuclear war are probably less now than they would be if two Communist powers were confronting each other . . .<sup>18</sup>

Next in the section is a set of "negative dimensions" about deterrence which all depend for their forecasts of doom on the failure of deterrence to prevent war. Of course there is not one shred of evidence offered as to why deterrence will soon lead us into war. The "negative dimensions" are simply reiterations of such things as the cost of the arms race, the lack of international trust implied by deterrence, and the terrible consequences if deterrence fails. The

section ends with a set of criteria developed from these negative dimensions. The criteria are used to form a list of "goals of deterrence posture" which the bishops oppose. The list includes hard-target kill weapons such as the MX, strategic nuclear war planning and proposals which lower the nuclear threshold. Recommendations include a bilateral freeze on strategic systems testing, production and deployment; bilateral weapons reduction; and a pull back of weapons from border areas. These goals and recommendations can all be placed in two categories with one special case.

The first category is those things which strengthen our deterrent capability. We ought to build our deterrent, both in strategic and conventional areas, to the checks and balances of our Congressional process. It is the only way to accomplish the items in the second category.

This category includes every method possible to bilaterally reduce nuclear weapons from arsenals or withdraw them from geographical areas. This must be done in a verifiable manner and should be pressed with all possible pressure. The second category cannot be realized without the first. Secretary Weinberger, speaking to the American Bar Association, compared negotiated arms reductions to negotiating a settlement before a trial. The negotiation depends upon the strength of the case and the client's willingness to go to trial, if necessary. How many lawyers would not prepare for trial with the expectation that

by being unprepared, the lawyer could secure a better settlement before hand? He said, "We must continue to show our resolve to modernize our nuclear capability . . . only by maintaining our strength can we produce the pressure necessary to get the Soviets to agree . . . to reduce."<sup>19</sup>

The special case is that of the proposal to freeze current levels of nuclear weapons. The major disadvantage of this proposal is that a freeze would kill any hopes of convincing the Soviets to reduce weapons. If the U.S. freezes now, the Soviet's advantage would be locked in the concrete of an international agreement. There would be no incentive for them to reduce from a position of advantage.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Section III. The Promotion of Peace: Proposals and Policies

This section begins with an excellent insight concerning world peace. That is, peace is not just absence of war, but the result of building trust, confidence and mutual respect among nations. A series of proposals are offered with an introduction which calls for a freeze. This freeze statement acknowledges the need for verification and bilateral actions.

Comments on the freeze were included in the last paragraph of the preceding chapter. The series of proposals following the introduction are reasonable and well articulated. Specific steps include renewed enthusiasm for arms control and disarmament, regular diplomatic discussion between U.S. and Soviet leadership and limiting conventional forces (although the bishops may support some selective increase in conventional forces in exchange for reducing nuclear inventories). The bishops also call for renewed efforts at solving international conflict without resorting to military force. Part A concludes with a short section (III A 4) called the "Role of Conscience." It is out of context with the rest of the section. Its subject is "selective conscientious objection." This term means an individual has the right to choose which war to participate in and which war to avoid. Alternative service to the community, unrelated to military

needs, replaces military duty. The bishops support individuals who must choose this way "in good conscience." This section typifies the uneven emphasis given to the pacifist tradition throughout the letter. Those Catholics who have honestly understood Jesus Christ's example of personal non-violence as a moral imperative have been a tiny minority throughout history. Catholics accept self-defense as totally compatible with justice. This pastoral presents a very unbalanced view by endorsing non-violence as a tradition of equal importance with just war. It inaccurately portrays a large and growing segment of American Catholicism as becoming pacifist. The authors may equate growing numbers of people concerned about the possibility of nuclear war with growing pacifism. These groups do not correlate. Most reasons for resistance to draft registration stem from the Vietnam era. Draft protests in those years were the result of many factors. Among them were an unfair draft with many exemptions favoring the middle and upper class and a war without popular electorate support because of undefined objectives and no believable threat to this country. I have talked to about 50 Catholic "conscientious objectors." I have only found one who was truly a pacifist. Most would not hesitate to use force to repel an unjust aggressor threatening a helpless person. The major reason for most conscientious objection was fear of combat coupled with the

knowledge that others did not have to go to war because they were going to college, were married, employed in defense industry, etc. The bishops do a grave disservice to America by promulgating a theory that each citizen should be able individually, not through legislative representation, but individually to review the reasons for a particular war and then decide whether to join the effort. That certainly opens the door to national defenselessness. The traditional concept that each citizen is responsible for contributing to our nation's defense is severely damaged.

The second part of this section is called "Shaping a Peaceful World." The authors return to the concept of building a world peace. The value of justice as a foundation of peace is recognized. The interdependence of people upon people as in a human family leads to an international interdependence of nation upon nation. The lack of an international structure to arbitrate disputes and enforce decisions is acknowledged. The idealism of world peace is realistically endowed with the problems of injustice, ideological differences and U.S.-Soviet mistrust. The bishops correctly surface a weakening in economic support to the Third World and growing U.S. indifference toward the United Nations. Somehow the stark economic contrast in the world must be solved. If not, gross human rights violations and abject poverty will continue to threaten political stability throughout the world.

## CHAPTER VI

### Section IV-The Pastoral Challenge and Response

This last section is a very carefully written challenge to Catholic Americans. The basic theme is a call to, "stand up and be counted." Carefully woven into the challenge for Catholics to become knowledgeable on war and peace issues is a sense of freedom. Statements like the following leave open a choice between pacifist and just war. "People must be educated in all the currents of our tradition."<sup>1</sup> "People may agree in abhorring an injustice . . . yet sincerely disagree as to what approach will achieve justice."<sup>2</sup> Describing the pacifist Catholic view, the bishops agree that some pacifist conclusions, "may be legitimate options but cannot be made obligatory on the basis of actual church teaching."<sup>3</sup> This sense of being free to disagree with all but the most basic church principles strengthens the document (only one principle is given: that is, there must be "some" limits on use of nuclear weapons).

The last few pages of the document address nine categories of American Catholics separately with the tenth addressed to the Catholic citizen. The underlying theme in each is the challenge of becoming informed and sensitive to the issues of war and peace. Actions to build peace and avoid war are advocated for each group. Military leaders are urged to pursue peaceful means of conflict resolution



before "considering war." This statement suggests our military leaders would consider war as a suitable recommendation to the National Command Authority (President and National Security Council). That indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the historical and current mechanisms for achieving U.S. national objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an advisor to the National Security Council (NSC) and the President. The NSC requests military recommendations along with those from the State Department, Commerce Department, the CIA, and other special advisors. The objective may be to protect the U.S. national interest or that of our allies. There are many ways of projecting U.S. power to achieve that objective. There are trade sanctions, monetary injunctions, political alliances, military power projection in the form of deployment of forces to "show the flag" or the withdrawal of military support, and many other possible options. The U.S. does not ever project power by "considering war." I earlier quoted Secretary Weinberger in describing our military as strictly a defensive force. Our military leaders do not consider war as an option. It would be totally against U.S. principles for this nation's military leaders to devise, much less recommend, offensive war.

The bishops then remind Catholic military of the prohibition against deliberate attack on civilian populations. That same prohibition is stated in Department

of Defense Directive 5100.77, dated 5 November 1974. The Directive also requires military members to be trained in the rules regulating armed conflict. Air Force conduct, including many prohibitions beyond targeting civilian populations, are included in Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law--The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, 19 November 1976 and The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, AFP 110-34, 25 July 1980. The requirement to abide by proportionality and to discriminate non-combatants and separate them from intentional harm is described in detail.

Men and women employed in defense industries are encouraged to evaluate their continued employment in view of the principles of this letter. A more stern message is left with those involved in the nuclear weapons business. Implicated are those involved in the design, manufacture, maintenance and repair of nuclear weapon delivery systems. They are warned of the tentativeness of their employment. The bishop's say,

Should we become convinced that even the temporary possession of such weapons may no longer be morally tolerated, we would logically be required to consider immoral any involvement in their manufacture.<sup>4</sup>

That brings us to the final chapter in which we consider the impact of this letter on the consciences of our military men and women.

## CHAPTER VII

### IMPACT ON MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

There are no empirical data to evaluate the reaction of Catholics to the moral imperatives explicit in this pastoral letter. There will be no reaction from the Catholic population until the letter is finalized, distributed nationally, and becomes a part of the Catholic adult education programs across the nation. Two possibilities will be examined in this chapter. Some general conclusions will become apparent as past practices and some scenarios are considered.

First is the most likely situation. A third draft will be considered by the bishops on 2 May 1983 which is essentially the second draft. The USCC requires the document be distributed to the bishops 30 days prior to the May meeting. That will require the typing and printing process to begin early in March. This is too short a time to significantly revise the document. Presuming approval of the draft, our Catholic military will be presented with two situations considered morally evil: the intentional bombing of cities and the "arms race." The wording of the "no first use" is too loose to qualify here as a unequivocal moral evil. Recall that it begins, "We do not perceive any situation in which deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare . . . can be morally justified." That simply means they can't imagine all possible scenarios. The condemnation of

the "arms race" is too non-specific to result in military people walking away from their jobs in the development and acquisition community. People's jobs are so diffused throughout a weapon system development program that a philosophical condemnation is almost impossible to bring to the conscience of any one person. The condemnation of targeting cities is valid, upheld in international law, DOD and Air Force directives and will be considered seriously by catholic military people.

The other possibility as to content and format of the final pastoral is hypothesized by Bishop John O'Connor, a bishop for military Catholics and their families. In an overview of the draft, dated 26 December 1982, Bishop O'Connor stated, ". . . perhaps the most critical question raised on the floor in Washington (16 November 1982--Bishops meeting) was: Is the Pastoral to be binding in conscience for Catholics? The response by some (which the Bishop agrees with) is that the pastoral be divided into three sections: doctrine, exhortation, guidance."<sup>1</sup> This would be a fairly easy task entailing a rework of only the last section. Only those imperatives listed in the section on doctrine would require Catholics to comply or risk being in danger of serious sin. The Bishop suggests only three entrants into the doctrine section: indiscriminate destruction (targeting cities), the "arms race" and the right and duty of nations to defend against unjust aggression. I have just commented on

the first two. The last has some interesting implications for the pastoral's defense of conscientious objectors. Bishop O'Connor would require nations to defend their people or their allies. I wholeheartedly agree. The recent spectacle of more than three million murders in Cambodia is grim evidence of the consequences of being unable to defend against unjust aggression. It is unconceivable that Christians could mandate unilateral disarmament of a nation and call it morally good.

The past record of American Catholic compliance with moral imperatives issued by ecclesiastical authority has not been overwhelming. A few examples:

Birth Control. The condemnation of the use of artificial contraceptives by Pope Paul VI is widely disregarded by Catholics. One difference is the document was issued by the Pope and not by a Bishop's council. As a result there was an immediate split in opinions among many Catholic clergy. Without unity of opinion on moral issues among its leadership, Catholics are free to use their own conscience. The moral imperative is no longer imperative.

Divorce and Remarriage. Large numbers of Catholics do divorce and remarry in defiance of a moral imperative that forbids it. There is unity of opinion, however, among the vast majority of Catholic leadership on this issue. Here the result is not clear. Catholics still do divorce and remarry in less numbers than their fellow Americans.

Those that do either leave the Church or somehow make "peace" with themselves and re-enter church activity. I propose that a small percentage, less than ten percent are held in conscience by the moral imperative against divorce.

USCC Statement on the U.S. Bombing Operation In Cambodia<sup>2</sup>

This statement in 1973 presented a moral imperative which had the potential for affecting military preparedness: "This committee condemns the bombing in Cambodia and feels that moral issue of massive and carpet bombing must be clearly faced."<sup>3</sup> This statement had little if any effect on the military operation. Again, it is difficult to draw a parallel because the Cambodia statement did not sweep into the churches of this country with the mandate and approval of the majority of American bishops as this document will.

In the final analysis, Catholics rejected a moral imperative prohibiting birth control for two reasons: first, to reject birth control measures would have been an extremely difficult thing to live out in their lives and secondly, most felt the Pope could not and should not dictate, with the threat of serious sin, moral behavior. The moral imperative prohibiting destruction of cities is not the same. First, many of our military duties with nuclear weapons and delivery systems is difficult, hard on families (alert duty, week-end work, dangerous) and generally unpleasant. Add to this the lack of approval by

one's church and society and an individual's own troubled conscience and we have the potential for a reduction in strategic preparedness. Second, American Catholics are much more inclined to heed direction from their own religious leadership than from papal pronouncements. The Services should begin a campaign to inform leadership and members of the reasons for deterrence, the rationale for possible tactical first nuclear strike in Europe and the defensive posture of our forces. A renunciation of any targeting policy that does not attempt discrimination of non-combatants is also in order. It's too late to begin educating our military people after 10 or 20 percent of our highly trained specialists feel they no longer "belong" as a result of social and religious pressure.

NOTES

CHAPTER I (pages 1-3)

1. U.S. bishops' ad hoc committee on war and peace,  
"The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and our Response,"  
Origens, October 28, 1982, p. 307.

2. "U.S. Bishops Debate War and Peace Pastoral,"  
Origens, December 2, 1982, p. 393.



NOTES

CHAPTER II (pages 4-11)

1. J. Brian Benestad, Francis J. Butler, ed., Quest For Justice, (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1981), p. 44.

NOTES

CHAPTER III (pages 12-15)

1. U.S. bishop's ad hoc committee on war and peace, "The Challenge of Peace," p. 307.
2. Ibid., p. 322.
3. "U.S. Bishops Debate War and Peace Pastoral," p. 406.

## NOTES

### CHAPTER IV (pages 16-27)

1. U.S. bishop's ad hoc committee on war and peace, "The Challenge of Peace," p. 312.
2. Edward Teller, "Dangerous Myths About Nuclear Arms," Reader's Digest, November 1982, p. 141.
3. Ibid., p. 142.
4. George F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), p. xxv.
5. Ibid., p. 80.
6. U.S. bishop's ad hoc committee on war and peace, "The Challenge of Peace," p. 313.
7. Ibid., p. 314.
8. Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 14 February 1979), p. 1-1.
9. Casper W. Weinberger, "Seeking a Consensus for the Common Defense," Defense 82, December 1982, p. 8.
10. Robert L. Spaeth, "Debating Disarmament With Catholic Bishops," Vital Speeches of the Day, January 15, 1983, p. 207.
11. U.S. bishops ad hoc committee on war and peace, "The Challenge of Peace," p. 315.
12. Ibid.
13. International Law--The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 19 November 1976), p. 5-9.
14. Robert Heyer, Ed., Nuclear Disarmament, (New York: Pavlist Press, 1982), p. 101.
15. Ibid., p. 104.
16. Ibid.

17. John R. Connery, "The Morality of Nuclear Warpower," America, July 17, 1982, p. 26.

18. Thomas J. Reese, "Should We Surrender?," America, January 16, 1982, p. 34.

19. Casper W. Weinberger, "Seeking a Consensus for the Common Defense," p. 8.

NOTES

CHAPTER VI (pages 31-33)

1. U.S. bishop's ad hoc committee on war and peace,  
"The Challenge of Peace," p. 322.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 323.
4. Ibid., p. 324.

NOTES

CHAPTER VII (pages 34-38)

1. Bishop John J. O'Connor, "The Bishop's Pastoral: An Overview," Office of Pastoral Support Review, December, 1982, p. 22.

2. Benestad, Butler, ed., Quest For Justice, p. 82.

3. Ibid.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Abbot, Walter M., ed. The Documents of Vatican II. American Press, 1966.
2. "A Symposium: The Bishops and the Arms Race." New York Times, 26 December, 1982, op-ed, p. B-9.
3. Benestad, Brian J., Butler, Francis J., ed. Quest for Justice. Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1981.
4. Connery, John R. "The Morality of Nuclear Warpower." America, July 17, 1982, pp. 25-28.
5. Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Air Force Manual 1-1, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 14 February 1979.
6. Geyer, Alan. The Idea of Disarmament: Rethinking the Unthinkable. Elgin, Illinois: Brethern Press, 1982.
7. Heyer, Robert., ed. Nuclear Disarmament. New York: Paulist Press, 1982.
8. International Law--The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations. Air Force Pamphlet 110-31. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 19, November 1976.
9. Kennan, George F. The Nuclear Delusion. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982.
10. Lehman, John P. Jr. "The U.S. Catholic Bishops and Nuclear Arms." The Wall Street Journal, 15 November 1982, p. 28.
11. McKenna, Joseph C. "Ethics and War: A Catholic View." The American Political Science Review. September, 1960, pp. 647-658.
12. Novak, Michael. "Nuclear Morality." America, 3 July 1982, pp. 5-8.
13. O'Connor, John J. "The Bishop's Pastoral: An Overview." Office of Pastoral Support Review, December, 1982.
14. Ostling, Richard N. "Bishops and the Bomb." Time, 29 November 1982, pp. 68-77.

15. Reese, Thomas J. "Should We Surrender?" America, 16 January 1982, pp. 33-34.
16. Schall, James V. "Ecclesiastical Wars Over Peace." National Review, 25 June 1982, pp. 757-762.
17. Spaeth, Robert L. "Debating Disarmament with Catholic Bishops." Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 January 1982, pp. 205-207.
18. Teller, Edward. "Dangerous Myths About Nuclear Arms." Readers Digest, November 1982, pp. 139-145.
19. U.S. bishops Ad Hoc committee on war and peace. "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response." Origens, October 28, 1982, pp. 305-328.
20. "U.S. Bishop's Debate War and Peace Pastoral." Origens, December 2, 1982, pp. 393-408.
21. Von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Eric. "Bishops on the Brink." National Review, 26 November, 1982, pp. 1470-1476.
22. Weigel, George. The Peace Bishops and the Arms Race. Chicago: World Without War Publications, 1982.
23. Weinberger, Caspar W. "A Rational Approach to Nuclear Disarmament." Defense 82, August, 1982, pp. 3-20.
24. Weinberger, Casper W. "Seeking A Consensus for the Common Defense." Defense 82, December, 1982, pp. 2-8.
25. Winters, Francis X. "Catholic Debate and Division on Deterrence." America, 18 September 1982, pp. 127-131.



END

DATE  
FILMED

8-83

DTIC



AD-A130 490

A SUMMARY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE US CATHOLIC  
BISHOP'S DRAFT LETTER--(U) AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL  
J H ROSCOE FEB 83 AU-AWC-83-204


2/2

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 5/6

NL

			END
			DATE
			FILED
			12 83
			DTIC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

**SUPPLEMENTARY**

**INFORMATION**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

## READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER AU-AWC-83-204		2. GOVT ACCESSION NO AD A130490	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) A Summary and Critical Analysis of the US Catholic Bishop's Draft Letter--The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and our Response			5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
7. AUTHOR(s) Lieutenant Colonel John H. Roscoe			6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS			8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS			10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)			12. REPORT DATE Feb 1983
			13. NUMBER OF PAGES 47
			15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclass
			16. DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)  Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited			
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)			
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			

AD-A130490

